










In my apartment in Moscow I keep many old pho-
tographs of my young mother visiting India – inter-
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viewing Jafri Ali Sardar, discussing her translation of 
Krishan Chander’s novel with the author, taking part 
in an official meeting with Jawaharlal Neru. I also keep 
the textbooks which were published in the mid 1950s 
and written for the Uzbek fifth graders experimentally 
learning Hindi (rather than English) as a foreign lan-
guage. My mother was one of the authors of these text-
books and also one of the first school teachers of Hindi 
and Urdu in the old city of Tashkent. 
“Russian and Indian—brothers forever!”—claimed the 
poster hanging on the wall of this class. But there were 
no Russians in the old Tashkent school and their teach-
er – my mother - was Uzbek after all.  Typically, those 
who were assigned the role of advancing the “peoples’ 
friendship” and mutual understanding were very often 
the Soviet colonial others. They were better at master-
ing the non-Western languages (often related to their 
own native tongues), grasping the cultural diversity of 
the foreign spaces and peoples which the racist impe-
rial Russians saw as indiscriminate or opaque. Once 
sent to such non-Western countries, the colonial So-
viet tricksters were able to establish sincere commu-
nication with the local population who instinctively 
trusted them more than the eurocentric and coloniz-
ing Russians. But these emisarries were required to re-
main the loyal tools of the Soviet empire and the medi-
ators of its soft power to the global South. Those who 
refused or attempted to outsmart the power (like my 





In the last decade, many scholars have started to discuss 
possible links and similarities between the postsocial-
ist and the postcolonial conditions (Kołodziejczyk and 
Sandru 2012, Chari and Verderi 2009, Suchland 2013, 
Kašić, Petrović, Prlenda, Slapšak 2012, Pucherová and 
Gáfric 2015, Annus 2017)1. These discussions have 
largely been initiated by either the Western experts an-
alyzing postcolonial and postsocialist others in typical-
ly area studies and hence, inevitably objectifying way, 
or the postsocialist people themselves—mostly those 
living in the West and having received an injection of 
contemporary critical theories including the postcolo-
nial one. In the latter case the postcolonial analogizing 
is used to explain the major shift that has taken place in 
the lives of the socialist people—the shift from the so 
called second world to the position of the global South 
or deep periphery today. 
Significantly, there are much fewer meaningful cases of 
the postcolonial scholars attempting to reflect on the 
parallels between their condition and that of the post-
socialist people2. Thus, in the spring of 2015 togeth-
er with my Indian and Estonian colleagues living and 
working in Sweden we organized a conference on the 
possible dialogues and opacities between the postcolo-
nial and the postsocialist feminisms. Symptomatically, 
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none of the postcolonial participants even attempted 
to address the links or parallels with the postsocialist 
condition or reflect on the reasons for their lack. With-
out conspiring, they focused each on their own local 
history—be it Latin America, Africa or India—not 
showing any interest in coinciding them with the other 
socialist modernity and its aftermath. 
The postsocialist feminists, mostly of Eastern Europe-
an origins, on the contrary, freely borrowed from the 
postcolonial discourse criticizing the subalternization 
and peripheralization of Eastern European countries 
after the collapse of the state socialist system. In their 
reasoning, the postsocialist women were seen as too 
advanced, emancipated and already westernized to be 
equalized with the subalterns who need to be liber-
ated by the Western world. The postsocialist women 
unanimously found it insulting to be analogized with 
the postcolonial other. I see this as a manifestation of 
an important asymmetry in many ways preventing 
the possibility of coalitions and solidarity between the 
postcolonial and the postsocialist people, and leaving 
each of the groups once again, alone and facing the 
global neoliberal capitalist modernity  with its inevi-
table darker colonial side. Today this global colonial-
ity 4 discriminates and devalues not only the former 
colonial subjects and the ex-socialist people but also 
many other groups that were protected before by their 
mere belonging to European/White/Christian/mid-
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dle-class/educated strata. I have been reflecting on the 
reasons for the lacking dialogue and deferred coalition 
of the postcolonial and postsocialist others, and on the 
necessary steps we need to take to build an alliance for 
a better and more just world. This article is a prelimi-
nary result of my reflections. 
It seems that the postcolonial and the postsocialist dis-
courses in their predominant descriptive forms refuse 
to notice each other’s histories or see them as relevant. 
They remain blind to any possible connecting threads 
between their mutual seemingly independent expe-
riences, and unable to theorize any overarching con-
cepts or notions allowing to see the postcolonial and 
postsocialist narratives as parts of the same story. To 
me, the decolonial option is a more promising tool for 
conceptualizing the links between different “wretch-
ed of the earth” and also for  preparing and launching 
“deep coalitions”5 for the struggle to dismantle moder-
nity/coloniality. 
It is necessary to differentiate between various lev-
els affecting the parallels and discrepancies between 
the postcolonial and the postsocialist conditions and 
imaginaries, and in doing so, to go deeper than the 
history of the state socialist system. The roots of the 
possible dialogues or the reasons for their lack lie in 
the intersection of the earlier historical layers, marked 
by the imperial rivalry and therefore by the imperial 
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difference in its multiple and complex manifestations 
6, and the later ideological and geopolitical differences 
merging with these original imperial-colonial levels. 
Once again, a racism without race?
A core category defining modernity/coloniality is race, 
intersecting with economic and social forms of the 
modern/colonial dependence.The difference in the 
interpretation of race and racism is one of the main 
reasons for the lack of understanding and deferred 
coalitions between the postcolonial and the postso-
cialist others marked by different forms of coloniality 
of being and often rigid stand-point positionality. In 
the case of the USSR and a number of other socialist 
countries racism acquired specific altered and distort-
ed forms merging with class and economic factors, and 
was not identified as racism either by the local people 
or much less from the outside. 
Race and racism were excluded from the state socialist 
social sciences and hence, any discussion of the mecha-
nism for the shaping of the human taxonomies,  had to 
be limited by the critique of the capitalist system and/
or the denunciation of the previous Czarist regime as 
the Soviet modernity’s own darker past. This deceived 
not only the naïve foreginers, including the fighters for 
the national independence and later representatives of 
the so called non-aligned countries whom the Soviet 
 
8
empire strove to win using its soft-power techniques, 
but also many local subjects who were brainwashed 
by the Soviet propaganda and awarded an honorary 
belonging to the second world. These Soviet colonial 
tricksters realized that they were too weak to start an 
open decolonization and had to choose a lesser evil 
and try to infiltrate the Soviet system from within, pre-
tending to be loyal to gain advantages for the suffering 
local people and for themselves. 
The strata of the colonial socialist others who could tell 
the story of their discrimination and conceptualize it 
as racism, was rather  thin. These groups were neither 
properly represented in the public discourse nor had 
any right to have a voice because they contradicted the 
Soviet modernity’s grand narrative of the backward 
people civilized by the Socialist Russians to be accepted 
and assimilated into the only correct form of moderni-
ty. The universal class parameter in the State Socialist 
discourse was used as a common denominator absorb-
ing race. Race then was translated into the language 
of class. Whereas in the Western liberal capitalist mo-
dernity with its darker colonial side race has remained 
the central factor into which the class distinctions were 
often translated in the proportion which was the oppo-
site to the Soviet recipe. 
In the Soviet “wonderland” the noble lineage and ed-
ucation were devalued and replaced with poverty, low 
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origins and illiteracy as “positive” factors guaranteeing 
social and economic promotion, welfare and security. 
One was better off being poor and illiterate because 
this meant he or she was entitled to be civilized and ed-
ucated in the only legitimate way sanctified by the state 
and the communist party. In the end a specific Soviet 
intelligentsia artificially selected from the previously 
disenfranchised groups, took central place and sang 
their dithyrambs to the Soviet power. It is these people 
who were later ardently supporting the Soviet prole-
tarian internationalist myth in meetings with fighters 
of anticolonial struggles from all over the world, and 
drawing a sharp distinction between the blissful Soviet 
paradise advancing the progress of the backward peo-
ple, and the grim racist reality of the USA and Western 
Europe and their colonialist policies in Asia, Africa 
and South America. 
However at a closer inspection the Soviet racializing 
and social engineering were merely a reflection of a 
typically modern/colonial mechanism of interpreting 
all negative characteristics through race. Even if one 
would not find here a commercial of a black child 
washing himself with Pears soap until he got white 
(McClintock 1995, 213), there were surely caricatures 
that depicted the bourgeoisie, the clergy and the aristo-
crats as racially degenerate people. The Soviet posters 
advertising the friendship of the peoples were based on 
the hierarchy which was racial in its essence and stagist 
in its form: the central or higher place was always occu-
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pied by the Slavs (in the order of their closeness to Rus-
sians as an etalon), while the non-European peoples 
were put lower and farther from the center. In a sense 
Bolsheviks were against racism Western style and for 
racism Soviet way. What remained intact in both cases 
was, in Weitz’s idea, the assignment of  indelible traits 
to particular groups. Hence, ethnic groups, nationali-
ties, and even social classes can be “racialized” in his-
torically contingent moments and places” (Weitz 2002, 
7). A biological interpretation of race by the 1930s had 
changed to culturalist arguments, with the significant 
exception of colonial spaces. In E. Balibar’s words, “this 
approach naturalizes not racial belonging but racial 
conduct” (Balibar 1991, 22). 
The politics of Soviet korenizatsija (literally, “rooting”) 
of the 1920–1930s, and later an anti-nationalist cam-
paign (nationalism being used as an accusation only in 
relation to non-Russians7), the forced deportations of 
the whole ethnicities, manifested the Soviet politics of 
creating and controlling nationalities from above. As 
Weitz points out, the social characteristic easily col-
lapsed into biological (Weitz 2002, 11), the class en-
emies became the enemies of the people and enemy 
nations. The Soviet ideology contradicted itself in cre-
ating nationalities in the periphery, on the one hand 
(including the imposed literacies and the sense of eth-
nic-territorial belonging), and on the other hand, re-
garding the national traditions and customs that came 
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to be associated with this ethnicity only due to coloni-
zation—as a threat. 
This Soviet hypocricy in relation to racism is hard to 
grasp from the outside especially if one is not familiar 
with historical details and cultural nuances. An igno-
rance about the Soviet reality and its propagandistic 
false self-representation is one of the reasons for the 
reluctance of postcolonial scholars to venture into this 
area and compare their situation with that of the So-
cialist and postsocialist subjects.
THE INTERNATIONALIST RHETORIC AND 
THE COLONIALIST LOGIC, OR  THE SOCIAL-
IST DREAM OF THE POSTCOLONIAL PEOPLE
The USSR with its showcase ideology offered a grand 
utopia or a new religion. The failed socialist modernity 
has lost its most important future vector and turned 
into a land of the futureless ontology. By losing to 
the capitalist modernity it failed to meet the expec-
tations of so many "wretched of the earth”. This was 
a traumatic experience that in many cases needed to 
be compensated or at least buried deep which is what 
the postcolonial subjects with leftist views and social 
expectations often attempt to do. But it does not lead 
to any critical analysis of state socialism or to a clear 
understading of differences between utopia and real-
ity. Many democratic social movements and thinkers 
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of the global South are still marked by a residual sym-
pathy towards the Soviet experiment, and socialism as 
such. For them it is difficult to equate socialism with 
colonialism, particularly since state socialism has al-
ways represented itself as an anticolonial system. 
The Soviet experiment was positioned as a liberation 
and particularly for the former colonies of the demon-
ized Czarist empire. Their main lost illusion was inde-
pendence, with which the Bolsheviks originally lured 
the colonies back into the Soviet yoke to later enslave 
them, to deprive them even of  the rights which they 
enjoyed in Czarist Russia, and most importantly, of the 
nascent local national modernities. 
The 1917 Bolshevik revolt was positioned as liberat-
ing for all toiling classes and tactically used to gain 
more allies and restore the empire. Yet it was some-
one else’s revolution and someone else’s history, which 
many anticolonial thinkers interpreted as a recoil in 
the sense that the expectations of the empire’s periph-
ery that blossomed after the 1917 February revolution 
and the beginning of the Russian empire’s demise, 
were abruptly aborted by the October revolt and the 
subsequent crashing of all national liberation parties 
and movements, constituent governments and coun-
cils of deputies, such as the Union of Mountaineers, 
Musavat, Ukrainian Central Rada, the Bolshevik Ter-
ek and the liberal democratic Mountaineers republics, 
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etc. The persisting myth of the lagging behind Asia and 
the Caucasus erases important historical events which 
took place prior to the October revolution and imme-
diately after, and signify the political awareness and in-
dependent goals of the colonial regions and elites. 
The Bolshevik revolution was far from being anticolo-
nial. It was a deferral and strangling of decolonization 
impulses that had just started to develop. As it has of-
ten happened in the Russian history, the good and the 
evil easily swapped places, enslavement was presented 
as liberation and  efforts to decolonize were branded as 
reactionary uprisings of the old forces, especially after 
the quick coming of the Soviet thermidor. The con-
sequences of this deferral and distortion have unfor-
tunately marred the history of the Soviet empire and 
its colonies from the start to the end, and are still not 
resolved today when these old grudges murge with the 
newer social, economic and political divisions threat-
ening to destroy the Russian Federation from within. 
In many anticolonial texts written by the fighters for 
independence coming from the Western capitalist 
empires of modernity, there is a shared reluctance to 
criticize the socialist world. The  alternative coloniz-
er looks more attractive than one’s own familiar for-
mer master. Particularly when this colonizer made a 
point out of advertising its distinctly internationalist 
anti-racist stance while practicing racism and colo-
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nialism all along. And even if the majority of the non-
aligned countries today have almost unanimously 
turned to the West for their models of the future or to 
different forms of dewesternization (trying to preserve 
the local axiological bases combined with the Western 
economic and technological models), it has not neces-
sarily been a voluntary and happy choice. Behind the 
pragmatic attitude and the need for survival, there is 
also a wisp of disappointment in that the state Socialist 
promises of universal happiness that have never been 
fulfilled. In other words, it is not only the postsocialist 
people themselves,  but also others in the world who 
have reasons to be nostalgic of the socialist utopia and 
therefore reluctant to dismiss or see it as similar to 
western imperialism and colonialism.
 
The above mentioned combination of proletarian in-
ternationalist rhetoric and the colonialist racist logic 
was only one of the manifestations of the typical Soviet 
double standard policy. Alexander Akhiezer pointed 
out this 
manipulative Bolshevist tactic of coinciding simulta-
neously with the cultural values of different and of-
ten completely opposite groups, sucessfuly persuading 
each of them that the Bolsheviks defend their and no 
one else’s beliefs and later using these groups for self-
ish ends. The result was not the common good as it was 
proclaimed, but a complete utilitarianism coupled with 
shameless demagogy and manipulativeness – not only in 
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economic and political spheres but also in the spiritual 
realm” (Akhiezer 1998,  chapter “Pseudosyncretism”). 
This element of the soviet system is seldom taken into 
account in its non-Western interpretaitons. 
Previously I attempted to define Russia as a Janus-faced 
forever catching-up empire meaning that as a dou-
ble-faced Janus, it had different masks for different 
partners – the servile visage turned to the West into 
which Russia has always longed to be accepted but 
has never succeeded, and a patronizing compensato-
ry mask of a caricaturistic imitating civilizer meant for 
its own non-European Eastern and Southern colonies 
(Tlostanova, 2003; 2010). The same configuration la-
gerly defines the relations with the  former colonies of 
other empires.  
The Russian/Soviet empire has been marked by an in-
credible diversity of economic and social structures al-
most impossible to unify within one (even pseudo-fed-
erative) state. This also referred to different forms of 
colonialism which typically coexisted and at times 
merged in the Russian imperial policies rather than 
succeeding each other as it often happened in other 
cases. In addition the colonial othered spaces were 
not sharply divided from the metropolitan sameness 
by the seas and oceans or by a distinct racial differ-
ence as much as the Russians would have loved to see 
themselves as “white” and “European” as opposed to 
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the Asiatic or Black colonial others.   
The Soviet propaganda was more successful when ap-
plied to the more loyal and open postcolonial people 
visiting the USSR than the hardened Western critics. 
The postcolonial guests had a specific optics marked 
by their anti-racist and anticolonial  agendas, took the 
offered happy pictures and statistics, fake testimonies 
and made-up narratives at face value and generally 
saw what they were pushed to see.  This schizophrenic 
Soviet duality ominously emerges from the seeming-
ly cheerful lauditory diaries, letters and stories of the 
African, Indian, Caribbean writers, journalists, ac-
tors, film makers invited to visit the Soviet Union, and 
tricked into  becoming the friends of the state socialist 
regime.  
(POST)COLONIAL INNOCENTS ABROAD
An interesting early example is Rabindranath Tagore’s 
Letters about Russia (1930)[1956] which includes his 
reflection on the “backward” peoples of the Russian 
empire in need of ‘enlightenment’ with the help of the 
Soviet Russians. Tagore uncritically reproduces the 
Soviet progressivist rhetoric when he writes about the 
history of Bashkirs – an ethnic group which has suf-
fered a lot as a result of colonization and Sovietization 
(70). The Soviet modernity constructed a false opposi-
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tion with  its own Czarist’s past whose many elements 
including the imperial policies of control and subver-
sion, the development of state monopoly in the key in-
dustries, and generally, industrialization at the expense 
of peasantry, were intensified rather than cancelled by 
the Bolsheviks. This operation of disqualifying the past 
allowed to re-code many people, social and political 
movements, ideologies, beliefs, and values—into their 
opposite. The easiness of this re-coding could make 
anyone into an enemy without moving a finger. Con-
sequently the former fighters for the national indepen-
dence with the help of which the Bolsheviks often came 
to power, automatically became the enemies and the 
bourgeois nationalists as soon as they tried to finish 
the strangled decolonization and continue fighting for 
advancing the national forms of modernity. As many 
other people who had the misfortune to be located in 
the sphere of the Russian/Soviet empire’s geopolitical 
interests, the Bashkirs were promised autonomy which 
was later curtailed through repressing intelligentsia, 
the peasants and the clergy, as well as through typi-
cal Soviet policies of mass sacrificing of dispensable 
lives (through famine) for the insane industrialization 
plans. 
Tagore could not possibly know that in 1920 a Bashkir 
leader of anti-colonial national liberation movement, 
Zeki Velidi Togan expressed his disillusionment with 
Bolshevism, pointing out in his letter to Lenin the cyn-
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ical and manipulative Bolshevik tactics: 
You accept the ideas of genuine national Russian chau-
vinism as the basis of your policy . . . We have clearly 
explained that the land question in the East has in prin-
ciple produced no class distinction . . . For in the East it 
is the European Russians, whether capitalists or work-
ers, who are the top class, while the people of the soil 
. . . , rich or poor, are their slaves . . . You will go now 
finding class enemies of the workers, and rooting them 
out until every educated man among the native popula-
tion . . . has been removed (Caroe 1967, 112–113). 
Similar deception characterizes the Soviet chapters of 
the autobiography I wonder as I wonder (1956) writ-
ten by African American poet Langston Hughes who 
was invited to USSR in 1932 to make an antiracist film 
which was never produced. Hughes made a long jour-
ney to Central Asia and his reflections on the Soviet 
enlightenment of the “backwards Asiatics” are not only 
a curious addition to the long list of innocent testimo-
nies of the fooled  foreigners but also a poetic if highly 
subjective look at the early Soviet (post)colonial life 
through a very specific lens, translating class and ide-
ology back into race.  Hughes wrote his memoir at the 
time of the mass famine and the beginning of mass ter-
ror but remained largely insensitive to both. Aided by 
the Eurocentric interpreter with increasingly anti-So-
viet beliefs, the poet attepted to justify his own blind-
ness to the sinister signs of the coming totalitarianism 
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by comparing the racial politics in the Soviet Turke-
stan and the US segregation: “I was trying to make 
him understand why I observed  the changes in Soviet 
Asia with Negro eyes. To Koestler, Turkmenistan was 
simply a primitive land moving into twentieth century 
civilization. To me it was a colored land moving into 
orbits hethereto reserved for whites” (135). Hughes 
is not naïve. He deliberately chooses one perspective 
and ignores others. The evidence of the Tashkent trams 
in which the locals can now ride together with the 
“whites” i.e. Russians, overweighs for him any discus-
sions of political repressions, marked or unmarked by 
ethnic-racial factors. 
Hughes easily equates those the Soviet politically re-
pressed with those at home who opt for racism and 
segregation as if the higher class belonging was au-
tomatically linked to racism or the anti-Bolshevism 
characterized only in the higher classes. During his 
trip the poet meets with only one particular type of 
people – the Russian Bolsheviks, the Russian Czarist 
time colonizers, or the poorest local strata which has 
fully accepted the Soviet power as the only source of 
support. Unable to speak any local language and pro-
tected by the secret service from meeting any politi-
cally unloyal groups, Hughes can never hear the voice 
of the local intelligentsia, businessmen or nobility who 
would strongly disagree with the Soviet mythology he 
is pushed to reproduce. Moreover he is not even aware 
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of the existence of the local intelligentsia simply repro-
ducing the racist Russian myth of the backwards and 
illiterate asiatics in need of the Russian civilizers. Yet 
Hughes’s coloniality of perception and of knowledge 
are unintentional as he easily combines a fascination 
with the artifacts of the ancient Uzbek culture and the 
racist myth of the talented Russian directors creating 
a national theater for the Uzbeks who have never had 
this artistic form before. 
In 1976 Afro-Caribbean lesbian feminist poet and ac-
tivist Audre Lorde was invited to visit the USSR. Her 
“Notes from a trip to Russia” are no less historically, 
culturally and politically confused than Hughes’s text 
but much less straighforward and simplified in their 
interpretation of race, sexuality, gender, and the inter-
sectional discrimination in the Soviet Union. Lorde’s 
perception is marked by an acute affective sensibility 
– she does not repeat the propagandistic clichés, rather 
trusting her own personal impressions of the people, 
of urban and country-side spaces, sounds, and smells. 
And this intuitive grasping balances her ignorance 
and helps her see the colonial affinity between Africa 
and Central Asia. Soon she starts asking inconvenient 
questions and manages to pinpoint the gap between 
propaganda and real people, always opting to escape 
from yet another meeting for the solidarity for the op-
pressed to go to the local fruit market instead: “The 
peoples of the Soviet Union, in many respects, impress 
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me as people who cannot yet afford to be honest. When 
they can be they will either blossom into a marvel or 
sink into decay” (28).
THE DARKER SIDE OF THE POSTSOCIAL-
IST  POSTCOLONIAL ANALOGIZING 
The postsoviet trajectory of Russia and its ex-colonies 
shows that first they were lured by the carrot of the 
catching-up modernization and even, in some cases, 
by the promise of getting back to the European bosom, 
but these models were grounded in false evolutionism. 
With different speeds and with different extents of real-
ization of their failure, most of these societies grasped 
that they will never be allowed or able to step from 
the darker side of modernity to the lighter one, from 
otherness to sameness. The only move they can count 
on is comprised of the small steps climbing the ladder 
of modernity leading ultimately nowhere, yet always 
enchanting with a desired but unattainable horizon. 
Then a number of postsocialist communities started 
cultivating disappointment in the European/Western 
project, and its critique, resembling the postcolonial 
arguments or even openly borrowing from them.  In a 
sense this was a repetition on a larger scale of  what the 
Bolsheviks earlier committed in relation to the former 
Czarist colonies: first a promise of liberation and then 
a quick and violent termidor and a slow endless lag-
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ging behind for the remaining tamed slaves. 
Yet, there is something disturbing in the appplication 
of the postcolonial theory to the postsocialist reality. 
When thoroughly analyzed it turns out to be Euro-
centric and racist, although it is a specific sort of Eu-
rocentrism grounded in typically modern/colonial 
agonistics i.e. a rivalry for a better, more prestigious 
place in the human taxonomy created and supported 
by modernity/coloniality. This classification of the hu-
mankind in relation to the colonial matrix of power 
and ontological marginalization of non-Western and 
non-modern people is evident in both capitalist and 
socialist discourses. The Socialist modernity practiced 
its darker colonialist policies differently in relation to 
European and non-European colonies and also in re-
lation to different historical forms of colonization and 
coloniality that coexisted in the vast spaces of this ter-
ritorially largest empire.  Soviet colonialism was diffi-
cult to detect, particularly for the outsiders, precisely 
because it was mutant and excessively intersectional 
(arguably more so than other forms of colonialism). 
Modernity/coloniality justifies violence against those 
who are branded sub-human. One of the consequenc-
es is the uncritical acceptance of the existing global hi-
erarchy where everyone is assigned a never questioned 
place, and even those who are unhappy with this place 
are scared of losing this already precarious position or 
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being associated with those who stand even lower. In 
many cases this turns into a victimhood rivalry detect-
ed in both postcolonial and postsocialist groups. This 
is a sad result of the  continuing coloniality of being, 
thinking, and perception, which does not allow to 
break free from the universally accepted agonistic par-
adigm - compete or perish. A true decolonization then 
means delinking from this logic and refusing to com-
pete for a  higher place in modernity, or for a tag of a 
victim which would allow to gain access to charity and 
affirmative action. Hence the Eastern European cling-
ing to Europeanness, hence the postsoviet reluctance 
to be associated with the ex-third world. In this case 
the postcolonial analogy is used negatively, and with 
indignation: “How can we be compared with Africans 
or Arabs? We are European and White”.
The postcolonial analogy applied to the postsocialist 
world is rather superficial and erases the nuances of 
many local histories. Reintroducing these nuances into 
the scholarly and activist discourses and advancing a 
critical self reflection outside the prescribed Eurocen-
tric mythology, is a necessary step  for the elaboration 
of theory and practice at the intersection of the post-
colonial and the postsocialist experiences rather than 
simply borrowing the postcolonial terms and con-
cepts outside their historical context.  The postsocial-
ist analogizing with the postcolonial discourse is too 
often done not for the sake of solidarity with the global 
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south, but for negotiating a better place in the mod-
ern/colonial human hierarchy and in order to not be 
seen as postcolonial others. In the political discours-
es of several Eastern-European states there is a rather 
jealous attitude to anyone who attempts to take their 
place as the main 20th century victims of communism. 
Hence their rejection of the Middle Eastern refugees 
who are seen as potential rivals in the historical vic-
timhood race. 
This is a peculiar form of colonial and imperial amne-
sia detected not only in the case of the former empires 
but also the former colonies and quasi-colonies which 
do not want to be seen as such, particularly if in the 
process of colonization the conquering empire stood 
lower in its racial status than the colonized countries. 
Thus the Baltic littoral is ready to forget the Teutonic in-
vasions, subsequent forced Christianization, economic 
exploitation, serfdom and the imposed roles of the sec-
ond-class Europeans. Likewise, the Baltic states do not 
focus on the Czarist imperial policies but continue to 
see the Soviet occupation as the main national tragedy. 
Benedikts Kalnacš reflects on the insecure European-
ism of the Baltic social and cultural profile marked by 
the constant balancing at the crossroads of the imperi-
al dominations from Russia and the German speaking 
nations in the West. The colonial periphery is a loom-
ing third reference point in the awkward positioning of 
the Sovietized Eastern Europeans from which they try 
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to distance themselves despite subconscious feelings of 
the affinity in their historical destinies (Kalnacš 2016). 
The local histories of Central, Eastern, South-East-
ern Europe were imperial and colonial histories too 
as for several centuries these locales have stood at the 
crossroads of various imperial struggles between the 
Ottoman sultanate, the Russian czarist empire and the 
Habsburg empire (the “older” second league empires, 
inferior to the winning capitalist empires of moderni-
ty). Traces of these complex relations and imperial ri-
valries are clearly seen in the identifications of Eastern 
Europeans claiming their place not in the capacity of 
eternal overtakers or second-rate Europeans, and not 
as the new subalterns of the global coloniality.
Exclusionary tactic and victimhood rivalry are becom-
ing rapidly outdated in the face of enforced fragmen-
tation and reemergence of the ultra-right. So it is not 
a question of encapsulating within one’s narrow posi-
tion, but rather a necessity of always being critical of 
our own locus of enunciation, of arguing from a specif-
ic point which we should not be afraid of displaying. In 
the logic of pluriversality we are all equal and therefore 
we have the right to be different, yet this difference is 
not a closure, it does not prevent us in all our diversity 
from joining the struggles crucial  for all.
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THE POSTCOLONIAL AND POSTSOCIAL-
IST COUNTERPOINT 
The lacking dialogue between the postsocialist and 
the postcolonial others stems, among other things, 
from the dis-coordination of the capitalist and social-
ist modernities, which shared many (mostly negative) 
features, such as progressivism, Orientalism, racism, 
providentialism, hetero-patriarchy, and a cult of new-
ness, but coded them differently, thus confusing their 
satelites, colonies, and their own citizens. The trajecto-
ries of the two groups were quite different. The former 
colonial other entering the larger world controlled by 
the West does not have to change his or her moderni-
ty – it used to be Western and remains today the main 
landmark for the postcolonial other who simply con-
tinues his/her progressive movement toward the cher-
ished belonging to sameness or in some cases, creating 
a national version of modernity which often continued 
the trickster game of manoeuvering between the two 
modernities of the Cold War times. 
Today the situation is simplified and there is no need 
to manoeuvre any more. The postcolonial other could 
at the same time cherish a dream of an other social-
ist modernity which however had to remain a dream, 
whose loss is  unfortunate but not catastrophic. 
In the postsocialist case, a lot more is at stake. The 
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postsocialist people were asked to forget about their 
version of modernity and start from scratch in a para-
digm of a different Western and neoliberal modernity. 
They had to reorient ourselves to someone else’s mo-
dernity  or go back to the national modernities stran-
gled in the 1920s during the re-establishment of the 
Soviet empire which first cynically used the national 
liberation movements in the former Russian colonies 
to fight its multiple enemies and gain power, and very 
soon announced them to be bourgeois nationalists 
subject to repressions8. However, going back to these 
shortlived modernities is hard as even their memories 
were erased from the official public discourse.
This configuration is different and more complex than 
the postcolonial trajectory and due to it the postsocial-
ist subjects seriously lag behind the postcolonial coun-
tries. Instead of the progressive development, there is a 
drastic change of ideal and hence an abrupt regression 
and a new progressivism, but much slower and hum-
bler – as if in punishment for disobedience and efforts 
to proclaim a different modernity.  
If we attempt to draw a schematic time-line for the de-
velopment of postcolonial and postsocialist discourses 
we will see that their relation reminded a musical coun-
terpoint: in many ways the two discourses coincided, 
but it happened at different historical moments and in 
different political contexts and prevented them from 
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hearing each other. The early postcolonial discourses 
were largely leftist, anti-capitalist and still progressivist 
without questioning the universalized western norms 
of education, human rights, democracy, women eman-
cipation— invariably understood through the Eurocen-
tric lens. However early enough there emerges a more 
critical kind of postcolonial theory which attempted 
to question the Western modernity as such (including 
its leftist versions). This critical postcolonial discourse 
follows the principle that postcolonial and other forms 
of  coalitions grounded in multispatial hermeneutical 
principles (instead of taking the other to a frozen dif-
ference) are more important in our struggles for libera-
tion than any one single form of diference, be it gender, 
race, religion or class. It is important to idealize neither 
socialism nor the constructed tradition with its pre-co-
lonial social and cultural systems. These sensibilities 
disagree with the post-Socialist stance both when we 
criticize state socialism and when we refuse to roman-
ticize the tradition. 
The development of the post-Socialist critique did not 
correspond to this postcolonial logic at all, neither in 
its temporal nor in its notional accents and nodes. Ini-
tially the post-Socialist trajectory was marked by an 
almost emotional rejection of everything Socialist and 
a fascination with Western knowledge, at a time when 
postcolonial scholars still largely rehearsed the leftist 
anti-capitalist discourses and at least indirectly opted 
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for Socialism. Later a number of post-socialist activist, 
scholars, thinkers started reinterpreting the socialist 
legacy in a less negative way, criticizing the Western 
infiltration of the post-Socialist academia, NGOs and 
other knowledge production bodies. They were doing 
it at the point when postcolonial discourse started de-
veloping its anti-Western modernity stance and objec-
tively the two discourses intersected, although the tra-
ditions they were having in mind were totally different 
and they did not hear each other at that point as they 
still do not hear each other today.  
This schematic juxtaposition of postcolonial and 
post-socialist trajectories still shows that there are 
indeed many intersections between the two but they 
take place at different moments and are triggered by 
different reasons leading nevertheless to similar results 
and even possible coalitions, because ultimately they 
manifest different reactions to the same phenomenon 
of coloniality.    
  
A DEEP BOTTOM-UP HORIZONTAL COALI-
TION?
The intricate experience of the Soviet colonial intelli-
gentsia and its lonely efforts to counteract  that I men-
tioned in the beginning of this article, should be revis-
ited and revived today, at a different level of tricksters 
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finally coming out and struggling in solidarity. Such 
“deep coalitions” to counter modernity/coloniality can 
liberate us from endless appealing to someone else’s 
ideals, free us from the double consciousness of those 
who cannot belong and will never belong. But these 
coalitions should be initiated from below, and nev-
er be vertical and hierarchical, never again imposed 
from the imperial center. Even more importantly, they 
should start  from ruthless decolonising of our own 
selves, minds, bodies, genders, sensibilities, and mem-
ories. But for that we need to work  hard and painfully 
to be our better selves. It is not only about eradicating 
ignorance and learning about each other. More impor-
tantly, it is about nurturing particular subjectivities 
grounded in correlationism, horizontal solidarities 
and caring attitudes instead of predominant agonistics. 
For the non-European postSoviet people it is crucial 
to remember and retrace the forgotten links with the 
global South, but to remember them differently from 
what the Soviet empire prescribed and controlled be-
fore, to bypass the distorting imperial mediation and 
concentrate on the positive resistance and re-existence 
as another way of being in spite of coloniality and be-
yond modernity, and the co-existence of many models 
of knowledge and perception of the world, including 
the postcolonial and the postsocialist ones.  It should 
be a coalition  not of the “offended” competing in 
their victimhood, but striving to change the logic of 
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the world order in such a way that  nobody is an other 
any more, that we are all equal not only on paper but 
in reality and hence have the right to be different and 
practice pluriversality in the world consisting of many 
interacting and intersecting worlds.  
NOTES
1. Although there are efforts to establish “postsocial-
ist studies” similarly to postcolonial ones, when I refer 
to postcolonial and postsocialist, I do not mean these 
terms as distinct theoretical paradigms  but rather as 
geopolitical conditions into which people are born and 
which they have no power of altering.
2. One example is Kalpana Sahni’s Crucifying the 
Orient: Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of 
Caucasus and Central Asia (1997). Her exceptional in-
sight and lucidity stem not only from the outstanding 
knowledge of archival sources but more importantly, 
from  her deep and subtle understading of the colonial 
lining of the Soviet rhetoric, which is very different 
from its habitual reproduction in the case of the ma-
jority of postcolonial interpreters of Soviet life.
3. Postcolonial and Postsocialist Dialogues: Intersec-
tions, Opacities, Challenges in Feminist Theorizing 
and Practice. International conference. Department 
of Thematic Studies (Gender Studies Unit), Linköping 
University, 27-28 April, 2015.
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4. Coloniality is the indispensable underside of moder-
nity, a racial, economic, social, existential, gender and 
epistemic dependence created around the 16th cen-
tury, firmly linking imperialism and capitalism, and 
maintained since then within the modern/colonial 
world (Quijano 2007). 
5. Deep coalitions is  a concept theorized by decolo-
nial feminist Maria Lugones. She sees them as being 
always in the making. Deep coalitions never reduce 
consciousness of the colonial others. Fanon’s views 
also turned to be too close to the tabooed SRs – the 
Socialist Revolutionaries who were the Bolsheviks’ old 
and successful rivals with a much more attractive  eth-
nic-national program grounded in wider autonomies 
for the members of the federation, a complex and con-
tructivist understanding of the nation and the central-
ity of peasentry for Russia. 
6. A global imperial hierarchy has started to be shaped 
in the emerging world system in the sixteenth century 
and has been transformed in the course of time. The 
post-enlightenment phase of modernity placed Spain, 
Italy and Portugal in the position of the South of Eu-
rope or the internal imperial difference. The Ottoman 
Sultanate, and Russia became the zones of the external 
imperial difference, rooted in different (from the core
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European norm) religions, languages, economic mod-
els, and ethnic-racial classifications. European norm) 
religions, languages, economic models, and ethnic-ra-
cial classifications. 
7. If the Soviet colonial others were accused as the en-
emies of the people as soon as they attempted to fight 
the Soviet yoke, the anticolonial fighters from the glob-
al South were treated in accordance with a more nu-
anced tactic. The Soviet empire censured their writings 
and represented them as ardent Marxists. This is what 
happened with Franz Fanon. His revisionist (from the 
Soviet Marxism  point of view) works were not trans-
lated in the USSR as Fanon dangerously insisted on the 
leading role of peasants instead of the proletariat, and 
accentuated the psychoanalytic perspectives on the 
double, banned in the Soviet Union.  
8. The people of the Soviet colonies quickly realized 
that the Bolsheviks  lured them back into the Soviet 
yoke to later restore colonialism. The anticolonial an-
ti-Soviet revolts continued until WW2  and in many 
cases long after. Yet the information about the Central 
Asian 1922-23 and Ibragim-Bek 1931 antisoviet an-
ticolonial uprisings, the Baksan revoult in 1928 and 
Khadzimed Medoev’s revolt in 1930 in the Northern 
Caucasus, Ukrainian resistance to Bolsheviks in 1917-
1920 and peasant revolts of  the 1930s  to name just 
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